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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
No. 13-1089 
 
KIMBERLEE WILLIAMS, individually, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Charles L. Williams, deceased 
on behalf of said estate, and as representative of others 
similarly situated; NANCY PEASE, individually, as personal 
representative of the Estate of William Clark, deceased on 
behalf of said estate, and as representative of others similarly 
situated; MARILYN HOLLEY, as personal representative of 
the Estate of Kathryn Darnell, deceased on behalf of said 
estate, and as representative of others similarly situated; and; 
DONNA WARE, individually, as personal representative of 
the Estate of Jennifer Graham, deceased on behalf of said 
estate, and as representative of others similarly situated; 
DONNETTE WENGERD, individually, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Jennifer Graham, deceased on 
behalf of said estate, and as representative of others similarly 
situated; ROSANNE CHERNICK, 
                     Appellants 
v. 
 
BASF CATALYSTS LLC; CAHILL GORDON AND 
REINDEL LLP; CAHILL GORDON AND REINDEL, A 
Partnership including a Professional Corporation; THOMAS 
D. HALKET; ARTHUR A. DORNBUSCH, II; GLENN 
HEMSTOCK; HOWARD G. SLOANE, a/k/a Peter Sloane; 
2 
 
IRA J. DEMBROW; SCOTT A. MARTIN; JOHN DOE 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 TO 100, are fictitious coporations, 
partnerships, or other business entities or organizations that 
BASF Catalysts LLC is responsible or liable for and whose 
identities are not presently known, which entities may have 
mined, milled, manufactured, sold, supplied; JOHN DOE 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 101 TO 200, are the fictitious firms, 
corporations, partnerships, limited liability 
companies/associations or other business entities or 
organizations whose indentities are not presently known, and 
who may have perpetrated, or are responsible for, are the alter 
egos; JOHN DOE LAWYERS 1 TO 500, are the fictitious 
names of lawyers and law firms, legal professional 
corporations, legal professional partnerships, or other 
professional business business entities or organizations, or 
their agents, employees, or servants, acting within the course 
and; JOHN DOE 1 TO 500, are the fictitious names of 
individuals whose identities are not presently known, who 
may have perpetrated, aided and abetted, conspired with, 
acted in concert with and/or are secondarily responsible or 
liable under law for the conduct or activities of 
_____________ 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
This putative class action lawsuit alleges that BASF 
Catalysts LLC and Cahill Gordon & Reindel conspired to 
prevent thousands of asbestos-injury victims from obtaining 
fair tort recoveries for their injuries. Decades ago, BASF’s 
predecessor, Engelhard Corp, discovered that its talc products 
contained disease-causing asbestos. Plaintiffs allege that, 
rather than confront the consequences of this discovery, 
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Engelhard, with the help of its attorneys from Cahill, elected to 
pursue a strategy of denial and deceit. According to the 
complaint, Engelhard and Cahill collected the tests and reports 
that documented the presence of asbestos in Engelhard talc and 
they destroyed or hid them; when new plaintiffs focused on 
Engelhard’s talc as a possible cause of their disease, Engelhard 
represented that its talc did not contain asbestos and that no 
tests had ever said otherwise. 
As pleaded, this lawsuit concerns years of purported deceit 
by Engelhard and Cahill. This action is not itself an asbestos 
injury case, but rather an action about Engelhard and Cahill’s 
conduct when they confronted asbestos injury cases in state 
courts around the country. The alleged scheme outlived most 
of the original plaintiffs, whose diseases have since taken their 
lives. It did not last forever. Spurred by recent testimony that 
Engelhard’s talc contained asbestos and that the company 
knew it, survivors and successors of the original asbestos-
injury suits have brought new claims against Cahill and BASF, 
Engelhard’s successor. The crux of their complaint is that 
BASF and Cahill defrauded them in their initial lawsuits and 
caused them to settle or dismiss claims that they would 
otherwise have pursued. 
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint in its 
entirety. Analyzing the claims individually, the District Court 
determined that each was inadequately pled or barred by law. 
Analyzing the various declarations and injunctions requested 
by plaintiffs—ranging from an injunction against the future 
invocation of res judicata based on past state court judgments 
to a declaration that BASF and Cahill committed fraud—the 
District Court dismissed them as beyond its power to grant. 
The Court did, however, reject defendants’ argument that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived it of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs 
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have appealed the dismissal of three claims: fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, and violation of the New Jersey Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Plaintiffs also 
defend their requested relief. 
We conclude that the District Court erred when it dismissed 
the fraud and fraudulent concealment claims. The Amended 
Class Action Complaint properly alleges the elements of fraud 
and fraudulent concealment—namely that BASF and Cahill 
lied about and destroyed the asbestos evidence to plaintiffs’ 
detriment. Neither the New Jersey litigation privilege nor 
pleading requirements stand in the way of these claims.   
The District Court did not err in dismissing the New Jersey 
RICO claim. Plaintiffs, obliged to plead an injury to their 
business or property, have not done so. They have alleged an 
injury to the prosecution of their earlier lawsuits which, under 
New Jersey law, does not constitute an injury to their property. 
Lastly, the District Court correctly discerned that it could 
not grant plaintiffs all of their requested relief. To the extent 
that plaintiffs attempt to have the District Court decide, at this 
point, the statute of limitations, laches, and preclusion issues 
that will likely arise in future cases, plaintiffs fail to present at 
Court with a whole or ripe controversy. Plaintiffs may, 
however, seek injunctive and declaratory relief aimed at 
resolving the claims alleged. 
Accordingly, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand 
for further proceedings.  
I. Background of the Case 
We accept as true the Amended Class Action Complaint’s 
well-pled allegations. That complaint alleges a sustained plot 
by BASF and its law firm, Cahill Gordon, to mislead actual and 
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potential asbestos-exposure plaintiffs into believing that 
BASF’s talc products did not contain asbestos. In truth, 
plaintiffs contend, BASF’s own tests and records proved that 
its talc products contained asbestos.  
Defendants in this case include both Engelhard’s successor, 
BASF, and Engelhard’s former employees and attorneys. For 
much of the events of the case, the relevant BASF companies 
operated under the Engelhard label.1 Thomas D. Halket was 
BASF’s in-house counsel assigned to asbestos claims. Glenn 
Hemstock was BASF’s Vice President of Research and 
Development. Hemstock supervised those scientists who 
“tested or conducted research on Engelhard’s talc.” Compl. ¶ 
42. Arthur A. Dornbusch II was BASF’s General Counsel. We 
refer to these BASF defendants as “BASF” or “Engelhard.” 
Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP represented BASF and its 
predecessors in asbestos litigation from 1983 to 2010. During 
that time, Howard G. Sloane, Scott A. Martin, and Ira J. 
Dembrow worked for BASF as lawyers at Cahill. We refer to 
these Cahill defendants as “Cahill.” 
The six named plaintiffs in this action represent the interest 
of a deceased spouse or relative who had worked in proximity 
to asbestos and died of asbestos disease. These plaintiffs—for 
whom we will often use Kimberlee Williams as a 
representative—assert fraud, fraudulent concealment, and 
New Jersey RICO claims on behalf of their deceased relatives. 
                                              
1 The Engelhard businesses included Engelhard Corp., 
Engelhard Industries, Engelhard Mineral & Chemical Corp., 
and Eastern Magnesia Talc Co. BASF acquired the Engelhard 
companies in 2006.  
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A. Engelhard mined talc containing asbestos. 
From 1967 to 1983, Engelhard operated a talc mine in 
Johnson, Vermont. “Talc is a naturally occurring mineral that 
is mined and then processed or used in manufacturing by 
companies in numerous parts of the United States.” Compl. ¶ 
68. Engelhard processed the talc from the Johnson Mine into 
products, such as “Emtal talc” and “G&S Talc.” Compl. ¶ 73. 
These products found use in wall board, joint compound, auto 
body “filler,” dusting agents, and children’s balloons. Compl. 
¶ 74.   
Emtal talc and other Engelhard talc products “contained 
chrysotile asbestos fibers, as well as other asbestos forms 
including tremolite and serpentine asbestos.” Compl. ¶ 75. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, multiple laboratory tests indicated 
that Engelhard talc, including Emtal brand talc and talc from 
the Johnson Mine, contained asbestos. Engelhard, and later 
BASF, “had knowledge” of these tests and their results, and, in 
fact, maintained “[t]he tests and assay results” in their records. 
Compl. ¶¶ 76-80. 
Faced with unfavorable test results, Engelhard ignored 
them. According to the complaint, Engelhard “represented to 
its customers, industry trade groups and the Federal 
Government that the Emtal talc was asbestos free and even 
marketed the product as a viable asbestos substitute, thereby 
causing wide spread [sic] and unknowing exposure to asbestos 
to United States citizens, including workers and workers’ 
spouses and children, nationwide.” Compl. ¶ 83. 
B. Engelhard gets sued for the asbestos-related death of 
an employee. 
In 1979, David Westfall sued Eastern Magnesia Talc 
Company, an Engelhard subsidiary, for exposing his deceased 
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relative to asbestos. Cahill Gordon defended Eastern Magnesia 
in the suit. The lawsuit turned-up “test and assay results” 
confirming the presence of asbestos in Engelhard’s talc. 
Compl. ¶ 91.  
Engelhard’s personnel and records demonstrated that the 
talc had been contaminated. Glenn Hemstock, then an 
Engelhard scientist and executive, gave two days of deposition 
testimony in the Westfall case. Hemstock testified that Emtal 
talc contained asbestos fibers. He “admitted that various tests 
performed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, both by 
[Engelhard] employees and by third parties, indicated the 
presence of asbestos fibers in Emtal talc that was tested or 
assayed.” Compl. ¶ 98. Emil J. Triglia, an Engelhard employee, 
also testified that Emtal talc contained asbestos fibers. Peter 
Gale, an Engelhard researcher, testified that he had conducted 
analytical testing on talc ore samples obtained from the 
Johnson mine. He recorded his results in lab notebooks stored 
in Engelhard’s library.  
 After these depositions, BASF, through Cahill, settled the 
Westfall case. The settlement included a confidentiality clause 
that prohibited the Westfall parties from discussing the case or 
sharing the evidence. Much of the Westfall evidence has yet to 
be seen again.  
C. Engelhard covers-up its asbestos exposure to mitigate 
future tort liabilities. 
Engelhard anticipated that the Westfall action would be the 
first of many asbestos lawsuits. In March 1984, Hemstock 
circulated a memorandum entitled “DOCUMENT 
RETRIEVAL—DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS.” Compl. 
¶ 128. The memorandum directed Engelhard employees to 
collect for discard documents relating to Emtal talc. It stated 
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that “[i]t is the policy of Engelhard Corporation to avoid the 
undue accumulation of documents that are no longer likely to 
be needed in our business operations.” Compl. Ex. 3. The 
memorandum instructed employees to collect materials related 
to Engelhard Minerals Ltd. and Emtal, among other 
“discontinued operations.” Compl. Ex. 3. The employees 
complied. “All documentary evidence relating to Engelhard’s 
asbestos-containing talc[] was thereafter gathered up, collected 
by the BASF Perpetrators or their agents, and subsequently 
was either destroyed or secreted away . . . .” Compl. ¶ 131. 
Next, the complaint alleges, Engelhard manufactured 
favorable evidence with Cahill’s help. Together, they 
assembled “template and stock pleading, discovery and 
motions documents for use by local counsel in asbestos injury 
claim lawsuits” that contained false or misleading information 
about Emtal talc products. Compl. ¶ 144(e). Engelhard and 
Cahill procured “false unsworn and sworn representations, 
including false affidavits, false and incorrect expert reports and 
discovery response verifications by [Engelhard] employees, 
[Engelhard] officers, and/or [Engelhard] consultants and 
experts.” Compl. ¶ 144(h).  
Cahill and Engelhard, and later, BASF, used the absence of 
inculpating evidence and the existence of false exonerating 
evidence to frustrate asbestos injury suits. The complaint 
charges that, when lawsuits materialized, BASF and Cahill 
misled the claimants about the facts. “[W]henever an asbestos 
injury claim or lawsuit was filed or came to BASF’s attention,” 
BASF represented “systematically and  uniformly 
. . . that Emtal talc ore and products did not contain asbestos 
and/or there was not any evidence that it did.” Compl. ¶ 138. 
Indeed, BASF’s lawyers threatened claimants and their 
lawyers “with the possibility of sanctions or penalties if 
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asbestos claims or suits were not discontinued by questioning 
counsels’ good faith basis to continue the claims” in light of 
BASF’s representations that its talc products did not contain 
asbestos. Compl. ¶ 144(i). Further, because BASF and its 
lawyers made these misstatements “in correspondence, 
responses to discovery and/or pleadings or motion papers,” 
they misled courts as well as adversaries. See Compl. ¶¶ 144(f), 
144(j).  
The scheme worked against the named plaintiffs. 
Williams’s husband, Charles, for example, developed 
asbestosis and lung cancer after a career at Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber. The Williams sued Engelhard in Ohio state court. 
Defendants told them that Engelhard’s talc did not contain 
asbestos. In response, they voluntarily dismissed the claims 
against Engelhard. Similarly, the other plaintiffs discontinued, 
dismissed, or settled their asbestos-injury lawsuits against 
BASF based on Engelhard and Cahill Gordon’s false 
representations.  
D. A recent lawsuit revealed the long-standing scheme. 
The scheme collapsed a few years ago, during a New Jersey 
Superior Court action. In that case, Paduano v. Ace Scientific 
Supply Co., a former research chemist for Engelhard testified 
that he had discovered asbestos in Engelhard’s talc while 
working for the company many years ago. No. MID-L-2976-
09 (N.J. Super.). He further testified that Engelhard closed the 
Johnson mine because it contained asbestos and that defendant 
Hemstock instructed him to turn over all of his talc-related 
records.  
The chemist’s testimony triggered discovery into what 
documents BASF had destroyed or concealed in the litigation. 
Many of these documents had been secretly kept in a Cahill 
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storage facility. The Paduano case settled and the 
incriminating documents were placed in escrow pursuant to the 
terms of the settlement agreement. Among the documents are 
tests from 1972, 1977, 1978, and 1979 that establish the 
presence of asbestos fibers in Engelhard talc. None had ever 
been produced or disclosed in earlier litigation.  
E. Proceedings before the District Court 
In the aftermath of the Paduano case, Williams and the 
other named plaintiffs commenced this action. The Amended 
Class Action Complaint asserted claims of N.J. RICO, N.Y. 
Judiciary Law § 487, fraudulent concealment, fraud, fraud-
upon-the-court, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. For 
these claims, Williams requests declaratory and injunctive 
relief intended to constrain BASF and Cahill from asserting res 
judicata, statute of limitations, or other defenses that may be 
asserted in future or re-activated asbestos-injury suits. 
Williams also requests a range of other relief, including class 
certification, a notice “informing Class Members or their 
representatives of the pendency of this action,” an injunction 
against further spoliation or misrepresentations, and “[a] 
determination of Defendants’ liability for punitive damages to 
Plaintiffs and the Class relating to the spoliation of evidence 
relevant and material to establishing asbestos injury claims 
against BASF.” See Complaint Demand for Relief ¶¶ (d), (f), 
& (i). 
BASF, Cahill, and the individual defendants moved to 
dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint. They argued 
that (1) the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the case 
because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, (2) the plaintiffs had 
not adequately pled their claims, and (3) the District Court 
lacked the authority, or jurisdiction, to order the requested 
relief due to either the Anti-Injunction Act or principles of 
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justiciability. The District Court rejected the challenge to its 
jurisdiction, but it accepted most of the other arguments. With 
respect to the N.J. RICO and fraudulent concealment claims, 
the Court concluded that Williams had not adequately pled 
them. With respect to the fraud claim, the Court determined 
that New Jersey’s litigation privilege immunized defendants 
from tort liability. With respect to the requested relief, the 
Court determined that it lacked the power to order much of the 
requested relief because the relief would undermine state court 
judgments in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act or because 
the relief would decide issues to be raised in future lawsuits.  
Accordingly, the District Court granted BASF’s and 
Cahill’s motions under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and dismissed the complaint in its entirety 
with prejudice. Williams has appealed the dismissals of the 
N.J. RICO, fraud, and fraudulent concealment claims, and 
challenged the District Court’s conclusions regarding its power 
to order her requested relief. 
II. Jurisdiction  
Defendants renew their Rooker-Feldman challenge to 
federal jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine strips 
federal courts of jurisdiction over controversies “that are 
essentially appeals from state-court judgments.” Great W. 
Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 
165 (3d Cir. 2010). The District Court concluded that Williams 
was not appealing from a state court judgment and, therefore, 
exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
We agree with the District Court that Williams’s suit does 
not trigger Rooker-Feldman and thereby deprive federal courts 
of jurisdiction. “Rooker-Feldman . . . is a narrow doctrine, 
confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
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injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Lance v. 
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quotation marks omitted); 
see Great W. Mining & Mineral Co, 615 F.3d at 166. Those 
circumstances do not appear here. 
Williams does not complain of an injury caused by a state-
court judgment. She asserts claims for fraud, fraudulent 
concealment, and N.J. RICO. Each of those claims hinges on 
BASF and Cahill’s actions before and during earlier asbestos-
injury lawsuits. In particular, Williams targets 
misrepresentations made by BASF and Cahill regarding the 
asbestos content of Emtal talc products as well as BASF and 
Cahill’s destruction of material evidence. According to 
Williams, it was BASF and Cahill’s misconduct that injured 
her, not any state-court judgment. Because this suit does not 
concern state-court judgments, but rather independent torts 
committed to obtain them, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 
not apply. 
We conclude the District Court validly exercised 
jurisdiction. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  
III. Claims 
This Court reviews Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo. 
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007)). 
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We will consider the fraud, fraudulent concealment, and 
N.J. RICO claims in turn. Before doing so, however, we must 
decide which state’s law to apply to the tort claims. 
A. Choice-of-Law 
The parties here brief and rely on New Jersey’s common 
law. But not all of the parties are from New Jersey, nor did all 
of the events take place there. We, therefore, begin by 
considering whether to apply the law of New Jersey, as briefed 
and argued by the parties, or whether to undertake a choice-of-
law analysis. 
All U.S. Courts of Appeals to have addressed the issue have 
held that choice-of-law issues may be waived.2 Our Court has 
been inconsistent on this point. Decades ago, we refused to 
                                              
2 E.g., P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 426 F.3d 
503, 505-06 (1st Cir. 2005); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 
F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir. 2003); Bilancia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
538 F.2d 621, 623 (4th Cir. 1976); Fruge v. Amerisure Mut. 
Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2011); Meridia Prods. 
Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861, 865 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 
743, 751 (7th Cir. 2012); P & O Nedlloyd, Ltd. v. Sanderson 
Farms, Inc., 462 F.3d 1015, 1017 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006); Johnson 
v. Armored Transp. of Cal., Inc., 813 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 
1987); Mauldin v. Worldcom, Inc., 263 F.3d 1205, 1211-12 
(10th Cir. 2001); Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739 n.15 (11th Cir. 1995); 
Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. 
Cir. 1961); Warner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 856 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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apply the doctrine of waiver to choice-of-law issues: “The 
appropriate law must be applied in each case and upon a failure 
to do so appellate courts should remand the cause to the trial 
court to afford it [the] opportunity to apply the appropriate law, 
even if the question was not raised in the court below.” United 
States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 144 F.2d 626, 630 (3d Cir. 
1944). For some time thereafter, this Court refused to apply 
waiver to choice-of-law issues. See, e.g., Parkway Baking Co. 
v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1958). 
Then the Court, in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 
Inc., assumed that the parties had waived their choice-of-law 
arguments without discussing their authority to do so. 619 F.2d 
1001, 1005 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980). Thereafter, our Circuit, sitting 
en banc, observed that “choice of law issues may be waived.” 
Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 180 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (en banc). As a result, “it [has been] an open 
question whether choice-of-law issues are waiveable [sic] in 
this Circuit.” Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Global Reinsurance 
Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d 417, 431 n.7 (3d Cir. 2012); see also 
Nuveen Mun. Trust v. WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 
283, 301 (3d Cir. 2012); Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 83 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
Our review of the law in this area convinces us that parties 
may waive choice-of-law issues. Permitting waiver accords 
with the law of every other circuit. It also makes sense. 
Generally speaking, a party abandons any objection that it does 
not make. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 
(2009). Of course, litigants may not waive issues that go to the 
power of the courts to hear a case. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982). But choice-of-law questions do not go to the court’s 
jurisdiction. See Neely, 63 F.3d at 174-78. Moreover, the 
doctrine of waiver serves a functional purpose. By requiring 
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litigants to identify and argue legal issues before the district 
courts, we ensure that we have a record to review on appeal. 
The same principles favor a rule that requires litigants to raise 
choice-of-law issues to the District Court. 
The parties did not litigate the choice-of-law question 
before the District Court. Further, neither plaintiffs nor 
defendants have challenged the District Court’s use of New 
Jersey law to analyze the tort claims. To the contrary—in 
response to our request for supplemental briefing, plaintiffs 
asserted that they “brought their case in New Jersey asserting 
claims including New Jersey state law claims of fraud and 
fraudulent concealment.” Williams Rule 28j Letter dated 
March 20, 2014 at 1, Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, No. 13-
1089. BASF and Cahill both agreed that New Jersey law 
applied and, moreover, that choice-of-law issues may be 
waived. BASF Rule 28j Letter dated March 20, 2014 at 1, 3, 5; 
Cahill Rule 28j Letter dated March 20, 2014 at 1, 3. Thus, to 
the extent the parties may have sought the application of other 
law to the tort claims, they have waived their right to do so. 
Accordingly, we apply New Jersey law.  
B. The Complaint alleges a plausible claim for fraud. 
We next address the District Court’s dismissal of 
Williams’s fraud claim on the basis of New Jersey’s litigation 
privilege. The privilege often immunizes lawyers and parties 
from recrimination based on their statements in judicial 
proceedings, but the privilege has never applied to shield 
systematic fraud directed at the integrity of the judicial process. 
Nor should it be. Accordingly, we reverse the District Court’s 




New Jersey recognizes a common-law fraud cause of 
action. A plaintiff seeking to recover for fraud must allege five 
elements: “(1) a material misrepresentation of a presently 
existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant 
of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; 
(4) reasonable reliance thereon by the other person; and (5) 
resulting damages.” Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 
253, 260 (N.J. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). 
2. Analysis 
Williams asserts that BASF and Cahill Gordon falsely 
represented that “BASF and its predecessor companies’ talc 
ore and talc products did not contain asbestos fibers” and “that 
there was not any evidence BASF and its predecessor 
companies[’] talc ore and talc products contained asbestos.” 
Compl. ¶ 344. The complaint pleads many of these statements 
precisely, quoting from various letters and faxes sent by Cahill 
attorneys on behalf of BASF. It alleges that BASF and Cahill 
offered these representations to Williams, for example, for the 
purpose of “obstructing, impeding, impairing, [or] 
terminating” asbestos-injury litigation. Compl. ¶ 347. And 
Williams alleges that, after receiving these communications, 
she and the other plaintiffs each altered their litigation 
posture—settling, dismissing, or abandoning their claims 
against BASF.  
Taken together, Williams has alleged that BASF and Cahill 
obtained “an undue advantage by means of some act or 
omission that is unconscientious or a violation of good faith,” 
the essence of fraud. See Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. 
Whale, 432 A.2d 521, 524 (N.J. 1981).  
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Nonetheless, the District Court dismissed the claim on the 
ground that New Jersey’s litigation privilege foreclosed 
liability for any statements made in the course of asbestos-
injury litigation. New Jersey’s so-called litigation privilege 
functions as a form of civil immunity: it “generally protects an 
attorney from civil liability arising from words he has uttered 
in the course of judicial proceedings.” Loigman v. Twp. 
Committee of Twp. of Middletown, 889 A.2d 426, 433 (N.J. 
2006). The privilege reflects “the need for unfettered 
expression” in adversarial proceedings. Hawkins v. Harris, 661 
A.2d 284, 287 (N.J. 1995). Cahill and BASF urge the Court to 
extend the privilege to the false statements and evidence given 
to Williams and the other plaintiffs.  
We decline. New Jersey’s Supreme Court has interpreted 
the privilege to “protect[] attorneys not only from defamation 
actions, but also from a host of other tort-related claims.” 
Loigman, 889 A.2d at 436. But New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
has never recognized the litigation privilege to immunize 
systematic fraud, let alone fraud calculated to thwart the 
judicial process. Thus, we are “charged with predicting how 
that court would resolve the issue.” See Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co. 
v. Wyndham Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 
(3d Cir. 2011). We believe that New Jersey’s Supreme Court 
would not extend the privilege to this claim. 
First, the complaint describes conduct that impairs New 
Jersey’s goals for the litigation privilege. “One purpose of the 
privilege is to encourage open channels of communication and 
the presentation of evidence in judicial proceedings.” Hawkins, 
661 A.2d at 289 (quotation marks omitted). Another is to 
afford parties “an unqualified opportunity to explore the truth 
of a matter without fear of recrimination.” Id. at 289-90. Here, 
the claim is that lawyers and litigants actively frustrated the 
21 
 
search for the truth and purposefully misled their adversaries. 
The purposes of the privilege are never served by allowing 
counsel to practice deceit and deception in the course of 
litigation, nor by permitting counsel to make false and 
misleading statements in the course of judicial proceedings. 
Indeed, when this kind of misconduct has occurred in the 
past, policy considerations have weighed against extending the 
privilege. In Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., for 
example, the Supreme Court of Hawaii confronted claims that 
DuPont and its attorneys withheld inculpating chemical 
evidence from their adversaries and caused them to settle their 
claims. 73 P.3d 687, 689-92 (Haw. 2003). The Court decided 
that the law’s interest in resolving disputes fairly and on the 
merits outweighed the competing interest in placing judgments 
or parties beyond reproach. See id. at 700. Although New 
Jersey’s litigation privilege is similarly concerned with “giving 
finality to judgments, and avoiding unending litigation,” 
Hawkins, 661 A.3d at 292, we think New Jersey would follow 
Hawaii’s approach on these facts. The practice of allowing 
attorneys and litigants to use unfettered expression to make 
their cases is to serve the courts’ truth-seeking function; it is 
not the goal in itself. Thus, when, as here, defendants have 
uttered words that prevent a fair proceeding, the litigation 
privilege provides no relief.  
Second, New Jersey’s Supreme Court has admonished that 
“[t]he absolute privilege does not extend to statements made in 
situations for which there are no safeguards against abuse.” 
Hawkins, 661 A.2d at 291 (quoting Demopolis v. Peoples Nat’l 
Bank, 796 P.2d 426, 430 (Wa. Ct. App. 1990) (quotation marks 
omitted)). For defamation and the like, judicial oversight or 
criminal or professional sanctions often adequately deter 
litigation misconduct. Loigman, 889 A.2d at 438. These 
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deterrents prove inadequate for systematic fraud. For one 
thing, the misconduct occurred in and out of courtrooms from 
Ohio to Pennsylvania to New York. No single court had the 
perspective or authority to mitigate the fraud or the ability to 
detect it. For another, Williams has alleged that BASF—the 
client—was responsible for “verifying the truth of [its] 
discovery responses” and for “[s]uborning or otherwise 
procuring false unsworn and sworn representations from its 
employees, officers[,] consultants and experts.” Compl. 
¶¶ 143(d), 143 (g). Professional sanctions have little deterrent 
value against clients. Finally, this alleged fraud apparently 
outlasted the careers of many of the perpetrators. However 
appropriate professional discipline may have been (or may still 
be), should the allegations be proven true, that discipline would 
be too little and too late to do any good for the plaintiffs or the 
courts.  
Third, the allegations of this case place the offending 
conduct far from the core of the privilege. Although “[t]he 
litigation privilege protects attorneys not only from defamation 
actions, but also from a host of other tort-related claims,” the 
privilege is “[t]ypically” invoked against defamatory remarks. 
See Loigman, 889 A.2d at 435-36. Indeed, the Restatement of 
Torts identifies this type of privilege as a defense to a 
defamation action. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 586 
(defense for attorney at law), 587 (defense for parties to 
judicial proceedings). This case is not a situation where a 
witness, lawyer, or agent made hurtful or defamatory remarks 
about another, as in Hawkins. 661 A.2d at 287-290. Rather, the 
allegations here describe conduct calculated to thwart the 
judicial process and, in that way, are more akin to malicious 
prosecution, perjury, and spoliation. The judicial privilege will 
not excuse malicious prosecution or criminal perjury. See 
Dello Russo v. Nagel, 817 A.2d 426, 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2003) 
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(malicious prosecution); Durand Equip. Co. v. Superior 
Carbon Prods., Inc., 591 A.2d 987, 989 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(perjury). Nor will it apply to claims of spoliation, which 
concerns a party’s conduct and not the party’s statements. See 
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 597 A.2d 543, 549-550 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1991). We conclude that it likewise would not apply here. 
Fourth, even a broad reading of the privilege fails to fit the 
facts of this case. “The privilege shields any communication 
(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by 
litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve 
the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection 
or logical relation to the action.” Loigman, 889 A.2d at 437 
(quotation marks omitted). Here, the complaint alleges, BASF 
and Cahill engineered the false statements and evidence in 
advance of litigation. Then, either directly or through local 
counsel, BASF and Cahill deployed their prefabricated defense 
against claimants as they arose. They did not merely use a 
permissible procedural device in bad faith, as in Loigman. 889 
A.2d at 437. They rigged the game from the beginning. Thus, 
we cannot accept, as BASF contends, that its statements were 
made “to achieve the object of the defense” insofar as they 
“were made with the aim of defeating Plaintiffs’ asbestos 
personal injury claims and shielding BASF from liability.” 
BASF Br. 39 (quotation marks omitted). The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has observed that “[s]eeking truthful, accurate, 
and non-tainted testimony certainly is the objective of every 
litigated case.” Loigman, 889 A.2d at 429-31, 437. How then 
can calculated false and misleading statements serve the truth-
seeking function of the litigation? According to the complaint, 
BASF and Cahill were not mischaracterizing the facts; they 
were creating them. 
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Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court has never 
immunized systematic fraud designed to prevent a fair 
proceeding. Neither have the trial or intermediate courts of 
New Jersey. In Ruberton v. Gabage, the cornerstone of BASF 
and Cahill’s assertion that the privilege extends to all fraud 
torts, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, 
applied the privilege to a party’s claim that he had been 
induced to settle by tortious threats of his adversary’s lawyer. 
654 A.2d 1002, 1004-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1995). But the 
Appellate Division described the issue on appeal as whether 
the threat “constitutes a malicious abuse of process” and, after 
concluding it did not, alternatively held that the litigation 
privilege would bar the claim. Id. Nothing in Ruberton 
persuades us that New Jersey’s Supreme Court would insulate 
BASF, Cahill, or future defendants like them, from liability. 
Neither does anything in Wately v. Shaler, also relied on by 
defendants. See 2013 WL 5299499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 
2013). In that unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the dismissal of a lawsuit 
brought by a former criminal defendant against the expert 
witness he had retained. Id. at *1. The privilege applied to 
defeat the claim that the criminal defendant had been misled 
by the expert because the expert’s trial testimony did not match 
his pre-trial description of how he intended to testify. Id. at *1-
2. Watley might create a basis for immunizing the expert 
witnesses who filed affidavits in plaintiffs’ asbestos-injury 
cases. It does not extend immunity to those who manipulate 
their adversaries in and out of court over a period of decades. 
Williams has pled a claim for fraud. The viability of that 
claim turns on whether New Jersey would extend its litigation 
privilege to a claim of fraud directed at the integrity of the 
judicial process. Based on the policies underlying the privilege 
and the New Jersey cases applying it, we conclude that New 
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Jersey’s Supreme Court would not extend the privilege to the 
fraud claim alleged here. Accordingly, we reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of this claim. 
C. The Complaint alleges a plausible claim for 
fraudulent concealment. 
The District Court erred when it concluded that Williams 
had not alleged a plausible claim for fraudulent concealment. 
Williams’s claim rests on well-pled factual allegations.  
1. Standard 
In law, spoliation refers to “the hiding or destroying of 
litigation evidence, generally by an adverse party.” Rosenblit 
v. Zimmerman, 766 A.2d 749, 754 (N.J. 2001) New Jersey 
courts oppose it: “Such conduct cannot go undeterred and 
unpunished and those aggrieved by it should be made whole 
with compensatory damages and, if the elements of the 
Punitive Damages Act are met, punitive damages for 
intentional wrongdoing.” Id. at 758 (citation omitted). 
New Jersey permits plaintiffs to recover in an independent 
action for harm caused in a prior proceeding by an adversary’s 
spoliation: “[T]he tort of fraudulent concealment, as adopted, 
may be invoked as a remedy for spoliation where those 
elements exist.” Id.  
To prove the tort, a plaintiff must establish five elements: 
(1) The defendant had a legal obligation to disclose 
evidence in connection with an existing or pending 
litigation; 
(2) the evidence was material to the litigation; 
(3) the plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access 
to the evidence from another source; 
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(4) the defendant intentionally withheld, altered, or 
destroyed the evidence with purpose to disrupt the 
litigation; and 
(5) the plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by 
having to rely on an evidential record that did not 
contain the evidence defendant concealed.  
Id. 
2. Analysis 
Williams has alleged the first four elements of a spoliation 
claim: As early as 1979, BASF faced actual or threatened 
litigation over asbestos injuries caused by its products. BASF, 
and its lawyers at Cahill, anticipated additional lawsuits in the 
future. BASF possessed evidence that its talc products 
contained asbestos, including assays, lab notes, and testimony. 
Williams could not have accessed the evidence—most of 
which was held exclusively by BASF and Cahill—through any 
other means. And, Williams now claims, rather than maintain 
the evidence, BASF and Cahill concealed or destroyed it. 
Taken together, these facts, if proven, establish that BASF and 
Cahill intentionally destroyed or withheld material evidence 
that they were duty-bound to disclose and that their adversaries 
could not otherwise access. Cf. Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. 
The parties dispute whether Williams has alleged the fifth 
element of the spoliation claim, that she was “damaged in the 
underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that 
did not contain the evidence defendant concealed.” Id. BASF 
and Cahill contend that this element requires plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that they would have prevailed in the underlying 




[t]here is no indication at all 
in the Amended Complaint 
that it was a lack of access 
to the allegedly destroyed 
evidence which resulted in 
the termination of 
Plaintiffs’ claims before 
obtaining a favorable 
verdict against BASF or in 
the settlement of such 
claims for amounts that did 
not fairly and sufficiently 
compensate Plaintiffs’ 
decedents for their injuries. 
App’x 30. 
We believe the bar was set too high. New Jersey courts have 
explained that a spoliation injury may exist when the conduct 
affects the size or existence of a damages award at trial. See 
Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber Inc., 961 A.2d 1167, 1190 (N.J. 
2008). The injury may also take the form of expenses incurred 
to litigate the case without the spoliated evidence. See id. And 
a plaintiff may recover “whether [the] plaintiff succeeds on the 
claim in the original litigation or not”; indeed, a plaintiff may 
succeed in the underlying case and nevertheless bring a later 
spoliation claim. See id.; Robertet Flavors, Inc. v. Tri-Form 
Const., Inc., 1 A.3d 658, 671 (N.J. 2010).  
In addressing this issue, the District Court looked to a 1998 
district court opinion that predicted that the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would not allow an affirmative cause of action 
for intentional spoliation, Larison v. City of Trenton, 180 
F.R.D. 261, 266 (D.N.J. 1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court 
has since authorized tort recovery for intentional spoliation. 
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See Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. Moreover, when it did so, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court did not adopt the strict causation 
and damages theories propounded by Larison. Compare 
Larison, 180 F.R.D. at 266 (predicting that a prima facie case 
could not be established unless and until the plaintiff shows 
that he failed to prove his original case because of the missing 
evidence), with Tartaglia, 961 A.2d at 1190 (holding by New 
Jersey Supreme Court that a plaintiff may recover from a 
spoliator even if the plaintiff prevails in the original suit). 
Accordingly, plaintiffs did not have to allege facts to show that 
they “would have succeeded in proving their asbestos injury 
claims against BASF,” as the District Court held, App’x 36, 
but rather facts to show that BASF and Cahill’s destruction of 
evidence harmed their case.  
Plaintiffs’ allegations that they received diminished 
recovery, that their lawsuits were impaired, and that they 
expended time and money to attempt to litigate around the 
spoliated evidence, whether singly or in combination, suffice 
to complete the concealment claim. Plaintiffs allege “that they 
were materially hampered, impaired and prevented from 
proving their claims that BASF’s and its predecessor 
companies’ talc ore and talc products contained asbestos and 
proximately caused their underlying asbestos injury.” Compl. 
¶ 337. Plaintiffs allege that their personal injury suits suffered 
as a result of the concealed and destroyed evidence—they 
settled cases on unfavorable terms, decided not to bring cases 
that appeared to be meritless, or failed to sustain cases for lack 
of proof that BASF’s products contained talc. Additionally, 
plaintiffs allege that they have “incurred pecuniary losses and 
damages” due to BASF and Cahill’s conduct, including “the 
expenses and costs of proceeding without” the spoliated 
evidence and “the expenses and costs incurred in the effort to 
replace, locate, or identify evidence.” Compl. ¶ 340. Taken 
29 
 
together, these allegations, if proven, demonstrate that 
plaintiffs were “damaged in the underlying action by having to 
rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence 
defendant concealed.” Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. 
We disagree with BASF and Cahill that plaintiffs 
allegations are “conclusory and implausible.” See, e.g., Cahill 
Br. 46. As a motion to dismiss, the Court takes as true “well-
pleaded factual allegations” and, after doing so, “determine[s] 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at 177 (quoting 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).  
Commonsense and judicial experience underscore the 
plausibility of Williams’s claims. Williams alleges that in the 
asbestos-injury lawsuit, BASF and Cahill concealed, 
destroyed, and lied about the presence of asbestos in their 
products. What could be more important to a claim that talc 
caused asbestos disease than proof that the talc contained 
asbestos? True, even with that evidence, Williams still had 
other elements to prove. All other things equal, however, 
Williams’s case against BASF would have been much stronger 
if she had evidence that BASF’s products contained asbestos. 
Moreover, the complaint contains allegations that Williams 
incurred costs and expenses attempting to litigate around the 
missing evidence. That allegation is not a legal conclusion but 
rather a fact from which one could conclude that Williams was 
harmed in her underlying case.  
The allegations are not rendered implausible by reference 
to the conduct of the plaintiffs’ lawyers in the underlying suit, 
as defendants argue. The crux of this theory is that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers did not actually believe BASF’s representations that 
its products did not contain asbestos and thus their clients could 
not have relied on those representations. For example, 
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notwithstanding the fact that BASF represented to Williams’s 
lawyers that its products did not contain talc, Williams’s 
lawyers filed subsequent asbestos-injury cases against BASF 
on behalf of other plaintiffs. Thus, according to BASF and 
Cahill, plaintiffs could not have relied on the misstatements in 
prosecuting their cases because their lawyers did not rely on 
them. 
We do not accept this argument. First, plaintiffs’ lawyers 
are not the plaintiffs themselves. A plaintiff, not his or her 
lawyer, must decide whether to initiate litigation or to end it. 
See, e.g., N.J. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2(a). So 
whatever a lawyer does on behalf of another client proves little, 
if anything, about the beliefs of a different client. Second, this 
is a motion to dismiss. Courts must accept as true the plaintiffs’ 
allegations and draw inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. 
Inferring from plaintiffs’ choice of counsel unfavorable facts 
about plaintiffs’ beliefs runs contrary to this rule. Third, as 
noted, the tort of spoliation requires a plaintiff to prove he or 
she was harmed in the underlying action by having “to rely on 
an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant 
concealed.” Rosenblit, 766 A.2d at 758. The tort does not 
require reliance on an adversary’s representations. Indeed, a 
lawyer or litigant who destroys or conceals evidence may be 
liable even if he or she makes no representations to his or her 
adversaries at all.  
In sum, the plaintiffs have alleged far more than a “sheer 
possibility” that BASF and Cahill injured them. Cf. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678. Indeed, the complaint states enough facts 
regarding the consequences of defendants’ spoliation that it has 
raised “a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal 
evidence” that plaintiffs have been harmed by BASF and 
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Cahill’s misconduct. See id. Accordingly, we reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of this claim. 
D. The Complaint does not allege an actionable claim for 
N.J. RICO.  
The District Court correctly dismissed Williams’s N.J. 
RICO claim. Williams contends that BASF and Cahill injured 
her by operating a RICO enterprise and by conspiring to 
operate a RICO enterprise. Because Williams and the other 
plaintiffs have not alleged that they suffered an injury to their 
property, as they must, we affirm.  
1. Standard 
In New Jersey, it is unlawful “to conduct or participate, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.” N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-
2(c). The New Jersey RICO statute also forbids a person from 
conspiring to do the same. N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(d). Further, 
New Jersey confers a private right of action on “any person 
damaged in his business or property by reason” of a RICO 
violation. N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-4. Accordingly, those injured by 
racketeering activity may recover in civil actions.  
2. Analysis 
New Jersey courts have not decided whether interference 
with the litigation of personal injury claims amounts to an 
injury to “business or property” within the meaning of New 
Jersey’s RICO statute, N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-4. We believe that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court would not construe “business or 
property” to include interference with the litigation of personal 
injury claims.  
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Injuries to one’s business or property differ from injuries to 
one’s person. Thus, in construing the federal RICO law, this 
Circuit has rejected the argument that personal injuries qualify 
as RICO injuries to “business or property.” See, e.g., Maio v. 
Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483, 492 (3d Cir. 2000). That said, 
Williams does not contend that the asbestos injury gives rise to 
a RICO claim, but rather that BASF interfered with her attempt 
to recover for the earlier personal injury. Under New Jersey 
law, this difference does not save the claim. New Jersey’s 
Appellate Division has observed that “an inchoate personal 
injury claim, unlike some other rights to sue, is not a property 
right.” Amato v. Amato, 434 A.2d 639, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1981). Indeed, “[t]he nonassignability of a right of action for 
tortious personal injury, because it is not a property right, is an 
ancient concept of the common law recognized in [New 
Jersey].” Id; see also Landwehr v. Landwehr, 545 A.2d 738, 
742-44 (N.J. 1988) (deciding that personal injury awards for 
pain, suffering, and disability were not marital property 
eligible for distribution in divorce).  
Because unliquidated personal injuries claims are not 
“property” in New Jersey, interference with a personal injury 
claim does not constitute an actionable harm under New 
Jersey’s RICO statute. The parties point to no New Jersey state 
court decision that uses a broader definition of property for 
New Jersey’s RICO’s statute than used in Amato. And just as 
the words “business or property” have “restrictive 
significance” in the federal civil RICO statute, see Maio, 221 
F.3d at 483, so too do these words narrow the types of injuries 
contemplated by New Jersey’s statute.  
Because Williams has not alleged an injury to “business or 
property” as required by N.J. RICO, we affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of the N.J. RICO claim.  
33 
 
E. The claims against the individual defendants. 
Glenn Hemstock, Arthur A. Dornbusch, II, and Thomas 
Halket, former Engelhard employees, separately contend that 
the complaint should be dismissed as to them. In addition to 
joining the other defendants’ arguments for dismissal, they 
argue that the complaint has failed “to state with particularity 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 9(b). The District Court, having dismissed the complaint on 
other grounds, never considered these theories. Because the 
parties have not focused on them on appeal, we decline to 
decide them in the first instance.  
We do, however, reject the argument raised by Thomas D. 
Halket that his innocence compels dismissal. That argument 
rests on three assertions: First, Halket “separated from the 
company in 1986, years before the plaintiffs even filed their 
lawsuits.” Hr’g Tr. 105:09-11 (March 13, 2014). Second, 
Engelhard did not conceal any evidence during the only 
asbestos litigation that occurred during Halket’s tenure. Third, 
“it’s only what happened later in litigation that was filed years 
after he left the company that . . . the company’s conduct 
becomes even arguably problematic.” Tr. 106:17-20.  
To accept Halket’s argument, however, is to reject the 
factual allegations of the complaint. Plaintiffs have alleged that 
Halket organized the effort to conceal and destroy evidence 
after the Westfall case. Though Halket may have ended his 
employment with Engelhard, the Complaint, construed in the 
light most favorable to Williams, does not support the further 
inference that Halket bears no responsibility for what he set in 
motion. Of course, discovery may exonerate Halket and, in any 
event, he will have the opportunity to contest the truth of those 
allegations in a later stage of the lawsuit. But on a motion to 
dismiss, a court may not accept a defendant’s factual 
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representations that he has been wrongly accused when the 
plaintiff has averred otherwise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).  
Accordingly, we may not look past the pleadings to affirm 
the dismissal of the claims against Halket. We leave it for the 
District Court to determine whether the remaining fraud and 
fraudulent concealment claims have been particularly pled 
against Halket, Hemstock, and Dornbusch. 
IV. Relief 
The final issue on appeal concerns the appropriateness of 
Williams’s requested relief. Recall that Williams requested a 
wide variety of relief, ranging from an injunction against 
further spoliation to a declaration that, in future cases, the 
statute of limitations would not bar plaintiffs from recovery. 
The District Court decided that certain of Williams’s requested 
relief created jurisdictional or justiciability problems. The 
District Court dismissed Williams’s request for declarations, 
injunctions, rulings, or “orders intended to impact Plaintiffs’ 
ability to pursue as-yet unfiled claims.” App’x 25. The District 
Court reasoned that the Anti-Injunction Act barred it from 
entertaining much of the requested relief because it invited the 
District Court to interfere with past lawsuits. In the alternative, 
and specifically with respect to declarations or injunctions that 
might affect future lawsuits, the District Court concluded that 
it lacked a case or controversy to adjudicate. 
We consider both the District Court’s Anti-Injunction Act 
ruling and its decision regarding justiciability. 
A. The Anti-Injunction Act 
The Anti-Injunction Act limits the power of federal courts 
to interfere with state court proceedings:  
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A court of the United States 
may not grant an injunction 
to stay proceedings in a 
State court except as 
expressly authorized by Act 
of Congress, or where 
necessary in aid of its 
jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments.  
28 U.S.C. § 2283. “The statute . . . ‘is a necessary concomitant 
of the Framers’ decision to authorize, and Congress’ decision 
to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.’” Smith 
v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011) (quoting Chick 
Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)). As such, 
the statute is designed to “forestall the inevitable friction 
between the state and federal courts that ensues from the 
injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court.” 
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). 
The District Court viewed the Anti-Injunction Act as a bar 
to “the Court’s very power over th[e] action” and, therefore, 
considered its application from the outset. App’x 19. It need 
not have done so. While the Act constrains federal courts, 
“[t]he Act is not strictly jurisdictional; it merely deprives the 
federal courts of the power to grant a particular form of 
equitable relief.” Gloucester Marine Ry. Corp. v. Charles 
Parisi, Inc., 848 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Smith v. 
Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1924)). Thus, the Anti-Injunction 
Act would be an appropriate basis for dismissal only insofar as 
it barred Williams from stating a claim upon which relief could 
be granted.  
The Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Williams’s requested 
relief. The Act applies to a narrow set of circumstances: 
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“[W]hen (1) a court of the United States (2) grants an 
injunction (3) to stay proceedings (4) in a state court.” U.S. 
Steel Corp. Plan for Emp. Ins. Benefits v. Musisko, 885 F.2d 
1170, 1175 (3d Cir. 1989). Those circumstances do not exist 
here because there are no ongoing proceedings in a state court 
with which the District Court’s judgment would interfere. 
Accordingly, § 2283 “has no application.”3 Thus, while the 
Supreme Court has admonished that “[p]roceedings in state 
courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by 
intervention of the lower federal courts,” the named plaintiffs 
in this case have no other proceedings pending anywhere. See 
Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 
U.S. 281, 287 (1970). Perhaps in the future the parties to this 
case will return to state court in an effort to reactivate their 
concluded proceedings. But they have not yet done so, and the 
Act aims to avoid “needless friction between state and federal 
courts” not to prevent a district court from deciding issues that 
                                              
3 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FED. PRAC. & 
PROC. § 4222 (3d ed. 1998); see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 
380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965) (noting that Anti-Injunction Act 
does “not preclude injunctions against the institution of state 
court proceedings, but only bar[s] stays of suits already 
instituted”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL 
JURISDICTION 768 (6th ed. 2012) (“[T]he act applies only if 
there are proceedings actually pending in the state courts; it 
does not prevent federal courts from issuing injunctions in the 
absence of ongoing state court litigation.”); LARRY W. 
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 492 (3d ed. 2009) (The Act 
“protects judicial proceedings only if they are already pending 
when a federal court is asked to take action.”). 
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may affect future state court litigation. See Okla. Packing Co. 
v. Okla., Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940). 
Acknowledging that no state court proceedings are 
currently pending, BASF and Cahill assert that the Anti-
Injunction Act further prohibits the District Court from acting 
to “deprive [past] state-court judgments of legal significance.” 
(BASF Br. 18.) None of the decisional law cited by BASF and 
Cahill supports this argument. 
First, in Hill v. Martin, cited by BASF, a pre-New Deal 
Supreme Court opined that the Anti-Injunction Act “applies 
not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any 
proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to 
making the suit or judgment effective.” 296 U.S. 393, 403 
(1935) (footnote omitted). That comment appears to address 
which types of state court proceedings may not be enjoined. 
(The answer: any type.) But Hill does not constrain the District 
Court because this case does not feature ongoing state court 
proceedings of any type.  
Second, BASF and Cahill reference Atlantic Coast Line for 
the idea that the district courts may not sidestep the Anti-
Injunction Act by preventing the parties from using “the results 
of a completed state proceeding.” 398 U.S. at 287. Atlantic 
Coast Line did not, however, expand the Act to circumstances, 
like this one, where the named plaintiffs have no ongoing state 
court cases. Rather, Atlantic Coast Line focused on the 
impropriety of a federal court nullifying an active and 
continuing state-court order. Id. Neither BASF nor Cahill has 
identified any active orders from the asbestos-injury suit. To 
the contrary, it appears that those cases simply ended with 
dismissals. Accordingly, Atlantic Coast Line does not 
constrain the District Court because there are no continuing 
state court orders with which the District Court could interfere.  
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Third, in U.S. Steel, also cited by BASF and Cahill, this 
Court disapproved of a district court’s declaratory judgment 
that conflicted with a state appellate court’s ruling on the same 
issue between the same parties. See 885 F.2d at 1176. The 
panel reasoned that “[t]he practical result of the district judge’s 
order . . . was to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the [state 
appellate court’s] ruling and on any judgment that might result 
from it.” Id. at 1175. Unlike this case, however, U.S. Steel 
involved ongoing state litigation. The case there had traveled 
from the state trial court to the appellate court and back again, 
and the federal court intervened in the midst of the remand. 
Thus, “[t]he district court’s order could [have] effectively 
prevent[ed] the state trial judge from proceeding in accordance 
with the Superior Court’s direction.” Id. The District Court’s 
orders in this case could not have such an effect because the 
state court litigation ended long ago. 
At bottom, BASF and Cahill appear to construe § 2283 to 
forbid federal courts from criticizing completed state 
proceedings. The statute enshrines no such rule. Of course, as 
defendants themselves note, a state-court loser may not appeal 
his judgment to a federal district court. See Lance v. Dennis, 
546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (discussing Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine). But § 2283 does not purport to displace doctrines, 
such as res judicata, that might guide a federal court’s analysis 
of the effect to be given a past ruling of a state court. It cannot 
be, as BASF and Cahill imply, that when a federal court 
decides that the claim before it has not been precluded by a 
prior state court judgment, it has thereby violated the Anti-
Injunction Act by limiting the effect of the prior state court 
judgment. Nor can it be that when a new federal suit seeks 
redress for harms suffered during old state proceedings, but not 
because of them, the Anti-Injunction Act stands in a federal 
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court’s way. To use the Anti-Injunction Act in this way would 
be new, burdensome, and incorrect. 
B. Justiciability  
In the alternative, the District Court concluded that 
Williams could not obtain certain declaratory and injunctive 
relief because she had not presented the court with a justiciable 
controversy. With respect to the relief targeted at solely legal 
issues anticipated in future cases, we affirm. 
A plaintiff must establish a justiciable case or controversy 
with respect to each form of relief he or she seeks. See City of 
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1983). Thus, even 
when a plaintiff has a claim for damages, in order to obtain 
prospective relief, he or she must establish standing to do so. 
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210-11 
(1995); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgment Act 
remedies). “To have standing to sue under Article III,” a 
plaintiff must identify “(1) a cognizable injury that is (2) 
causally connected to the alleged conduct and is (3) capable of 
being redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Pa. Family 
Institute, Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 2007); Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
Moreover, the judicial power does not extend to hypothetical 
disputes, and federal courts may not “give opinions advising 
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” 
Chafin v. Chafin, --- U.S. ----, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) 
(alterations and quotation marks omitted). And in order to be 
justiciable, a claim must be ripe for review. Ohio Forestry 
Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1998). 
We see two defects in William’s requested relief. 
First, Williams runs afoul of the rule that “a litigant may 
not use a declaratory-judgment action to obtain piecemeal 
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adjudication of defenses that would not finally and 
conclusively resolve the underlying controversy.” 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 n.7 
(2007). Williams requests declarations (or injunctions) 
determining rights and defenses available to BASF and Cahill 
in future proceedings. This relief, however, invites the District 
Court to wade into a legal conflict that is not before it—the 
viability of a particular plaintiff’s asbestos-injury claim against 
BASF. Under Article III, plaintiffs may not seek a judgment 
that “would merely determine a collateral legal issue governing 
certain aspects of their pending or future suits.” Calderon v. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998). A declaration from the 
District Court about the preclusive effect of past judgments, for 
example, might determine whether BASF’s past judgments 
were “valid” and, therefore, preclusive. See, e.g., Mortgagelinq 
Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536, 346 
(N.J. 1995) (noting that a judgment must be valid and final in 
order to have preclusive effect). But that declaration would not 
decide BASF’s liability to a particular plaintiff for a particular 
asbestos injury. In this way, Williams’s request resembles that 
of a prisoner who sued to prevent the state from invoking an 
affirmative defense in an anticipated, but unfiled, § 1983 claim. 
Ashmus, 523 U.S. at 747-59. In this case and in that one, the 
plaintiff asks the trial court to determine in part what would be 
litigated in full on a later date. 
Second, and relatedly, issues that may arise in state court 
asbestos-injury litigation are not ripe for review. BASF and 
Cahill have not asserted any defenses to plaintiffs’ asbestos-
injury claims and, in fact, the named plaintiffs to this suit have 
not brought any such claims. We see no hardship to parties 
imposed by refusing to answer these questions now, as 
plaintiffs likely will not face state court defenses until they file 
or seek to re-active their state court cases. Moreover, these 
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questions are abstact at this stage. The identity of the parties, 
the nature of the claims and defenses, and the substantive law 
to be applied are all unknown. Thus, although the parties 
certainly have adverse interests on these matters, an injunction 
or declaration about future legal defenses would not provide a 
conclusive resolution of an existing controversy. The issues 
are, therefore, unripe. See Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Reno, 76 
F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (3d Cir. 1996); see also MedImmune, 
Inc., 549 U.S. at 128 n.8 (observing that these sorts of 
justiciability problems may be characterized as problems of 
either “standing” or “ripeness”). 
We conclude that Williams may not seek in this suit a 
determination of a legal issue anticipated in subsequent 
proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
dismissal of Williams’s claims to declaratory or injunctive 
relief to the extent Williams seeks to enjoin BASF and Cahill 
from invoking res judicata, laches, statute of limitation 
doctrines, or other similar issues, in future proceedings before 
other courts. That said, we see no constitutional barrier to the 
District Court ordering a notice program or enjoining 
defendants from further spoliation if the proofs warrant the 
relief.  
V. Conclusion 
The District Court dismissed each of Williams’s claims, 
including the N.J. RICO, fraud, and fraudulent concealment 
claims contested here. With respect to the fraud and fraudulent 
concealment claims, the District Court erred. The New Jersey 
litigation privilege does not immunize systematic fraud 
directed at adversarial parties and the courts. The tort of 
fraudulent concealment, which encompasses claims of 
spoliation, does not require Williams to prove that she would 
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have prevailed on the merits of her asbestos-injury case. The 
alleged facts of harmful reliance suffice to state the claim. 
With respect to the District Court’s conclusion that it would 
be unable to order Williams’s requested relief, we reverse in 
part and affirm in part. To the extent that Williams’s relief 
invites the District Court to decide matters to be raised in other 
litigation, Williams has not presented a justiciable controversy 
for which that relief would be appropriate. To the extent that 
Williams seeks remedies for the alleged fraud and spoliation, 
including declaratory and injunctive relief, the District Court is 
not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act from providing them. 
We remand for further proceedings. We also direct the 
parties to inform the District Court of any developments in 
state court proceedings that might be pertinent to the exercise 
or abstention of its jurisdictional authority.  
